RECENT CASES by unknown
YALB LAW JOURNAL.
RECENT CASES.
AcCIDEr AT CROSSING--STATUTORY SIGNAIL-NEGLIGRKCE.-BROwx V.
CMCAGO AND N. W. RY. Co., 85 N. W. 271 (Wis.).-Defendant's servant ran
one of its passenger trains at an unlawful rate of speed across a public street,
without giving any signal of its approach by sounding the engine bell or
whistle, whereby plaintiff, attempting to pass over crossing, was killed. Held,
that contributory negligence was a good defense.
The plaintiff depended upon a statute which made railway corporations
liable to any person injured for all damages caused by trains running at an ex-
cessive rate of speed. Plaintiff claimed the railroad was liable regardless of
the question of contributory negligence. The court held with Schneider v.
Railroad Co., 99 Wis. 378 ; and Groesbeck v. C., M., & St. P. R. Co., 93 Wis.
505, that such a legal restraint put upon a railroad goes no further than to
render the company liable to the penalty imposed, leaving the person injured
remediless, if he contributes to his injury by his own want of ordinary care.
ATTORNEY AND CLmxT-VALuE o~r SERVICES-EXPERT TESTimONY--QUES-
TION FOR JURY.--SA DERS ET AL. V. GRAvES, 105 Fed. Rep. 849.-In an action
where an attorney seeks to recover the value of services rendered, the jury are
not bound by evidence established by expert testimony as to the value of
such services. Held, that they were entitled to use their own judgment in
finding value; and it was error to instruct them otherwise.
While the court felt bound by the leading case of Head v. Hargrave, 105
U. S. 45, to find as above, it nevertheless uses the occasion to dissent from
the views expressed in that case; and says in its opinion that other persons
than attorneys are incompetent to judge of the value of attorneys' services,
cites the following in support of this view: Rog. Expert Test., pp. 380, 381,
26; Lawson, Exp. E ., p. 96; Ferguson v. Hubbell, 97 N. Y. 513; Wood v.
Barker, 49 Mich. 295.
BOYCOTTS--INJUNCTIONS -DAMAGES-BUILDERS' ASsOcATIONS- REEDO
OF CONTRAT-NOTICE.-MASTER BUILDERS' ASSOCIATION ET AL. v. DOMASCIO,
63 Pac. 782 (Colo.).-Held, a notice to the effect that members of a builders'
association would refuse to bid on a building if a bid from D, a non-member
of said association, were received in competition with theirs, is not tortious
nor would it be ground for an injunction against said association by D, even
though an architect empowered to award the contract excluded D's bid be-
cause of said notice.
The court followed the rule as laid down in Manufacturing Co. v. Holls,
54 Minn. 223 ; Macauley'v. Tierney, 33 Ad. 1. Moreover the act of the ap-
pellants was warranted by competition and was not an infringement of any
property right of appellee's. (See 10 Yale LawJournal 253, 254.)
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CARRIERs--Loss or BAGGAGE-LLA33LITIMS.-MARSHALL V. PONTIAC, 0.,
AND N. R. R. Co., 85 N. W. 242 (Mich.).-Plaintiff bought a ticket for the
sole purpose of checking his trunk. He did not ride on the train. The trunk
arrived safely at its destination, but was stolen from the baggage-room by
burglars. Held, that defendant company was a gratuitous bailee, and only
liable for gross negligence.
The same rules of care and diligence on the part of a railroad company
apply whether the baggage is forwarded on same, preceding or subsequent
train. Warren v. Burlington, etc., R. R. Co., 92 Am. Dec. 389; Logan v.
Pontchartrain Ry., 11 Rob. (La.) 24. These cases apply to bona Ede passen-
gers. The court holds that inasmuch as the plaintiff did not intend to be a
passenger, but intended to go to his destination by his own conveyance, he
might have sold his ticket to another passenger, thus paying nothing for the
transportation of his baggage, and stand in no different light from that in
which he does now. He was not a bona Ede passenger, and the railroad com-
pany was a gratuitous bailee.
COLLEGEs-LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO STUDENT.-CURRIER V. TRUSTEES OF
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE Er AL., 105 FED. 886.-A college by reason of its
eleemosynary nature and its relation to its students, is not liable for a
personal injury to a student caused by the negligence of the superintendent of
college buildings, in throwing down a chimney, while clearing land, owned by
the college, preliminary to erecting thereon a heating plant for college purposes.
This is a unique case, as the liability of a college, for a tort committed by
its agent, has not been definitely decided. A corporation established for the
maintenance of a public charitable hospital, which has exercised due carein the
selection of its agents is not liable for injury to a patient caused by their
negligence. McDonald v Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432. A student,
upon entering college, submits himself, physically and intellectually, to the
college management and as a college is, in part, a charitable institution, not
managed for private gain, it would seem against principle to allow it to be
held liable in this case.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DOG LICENSES-HUMANE SocIETY-DUE PROCESS.-
Fox v. MoH.&wx & H. R. HUmNE SOCIETY, 59 U. S. 353 (N. Y.).-The tak-
ing of dogs, for the non-payment of a license fee, by a humane society having
such power conferred upon it by statute, does not constitute a taking of prop-
erty without due process of law.
Summary confiscation of domestic animals would undoubtedly be uncon
°
stitutional. Rockwellv. Nearing, 35 N. Y. 302. But dogs have always been
held to be entitled to less regard than more useful and less harmful animals.
Hence, though dogs are recognized as property to a certain degree, it is within
the discretion of the legislature to say how far. dogs shallbe so recognized; and
taxes upon dogs and regulations as regards them have in most States been re-
garded as a legitimate exercise of the police power. Tower v. Tower, 18 Pick.
262; Morqyv. Brown, 42 N.H. 373; Tenny v. Luiz, 16 Wis. 566. A con-
trary view is taken in Washington v. Meigs, 1 McArth. 53.
CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-BREAcH-DIscHARGE FOR CAusE-PART
PERFORMANCE---QUANTUM MERUIT.-HILDEBRAND v. AMERICAN PINE ART Co.,
85 N. W. 268 (Wis.).-Plaintiff bound himself to work solely for the defendant
for one year. He was discharged for cause before the end of the period of em-
ployment. Held, that plaintiff could recover on the contract for part per-
formance.
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In England if an employee is prevented from carrying out his contract, be-
ing discharged for cause, he cannot recover for services rendered up to the time
of his discharge. Smith, Mast. and Ser. (Ed. 1895) p. 220 ; Wood, Mast.and Ser., Sec. 129. This harsh rule is followed by few of the American States.Contracts for specified time are deemed apportionable, and a servant dis-charged for cause is entitled to recover for work actually done. 14 Am. &
Eng. Ency. of'Law, 793.
CONTRACT OF SALE-BREACH OF WARRANTY-RECISSION.--WORCESTER
MFG. CO. V. WATERBURY BRASS Co., 48 Atl. 422 (Conn.).-Defendant made a
contract to purchase a certain machine at a specified price. Plaintiff delivered
machine, which was accepted by defendant, but, after a trial, failed to work as
warranted. Held, defendant could not rescind contract and return machine
for a mere breach of warranty.
The law on this subject is in a very unsatisfactory condition. The weight
of authority seems to support the decision in the case at bar. Story on Sales,
Sec. 421; Scranton v. Trading Co., 37 Conn. 135 ; Norton v. Dreyfuss, 106
N. Y. 90; Merzick v. Wiltse, 37 Minn. 41. But recognized text-writers and
courts have held a warranty to be a condition, a breach of which is groundfor a recission of the contract. Parsons on Cont. Vol. I, p. 592; Dow v.isher, 1 Cush. 271 ; Dill v. O'Ferrall, 45 Ind. 268 ; Marshall v. Perry, 67
Maine 78.
CONVEYANCE IN TRUST-VALIDITY-CHARITABLE TRUST-TROUTMAN ET
AL. v. DE BOISSIERE ODD FELLOWS' ORPHANS' HOMXE AND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL
ASSOCIATION ET AL., 64 Pac. 33 (Kan.).-De Boissiere conveyed property to
trustees "in trust, to provide a home upon said premises for the orphan chil-
dren of deceased Odd Fellows of the State of Kansas." Held, to be a valid
public charity.
A charity whose benefits are confined to those who by their own voluntary
action have become members of a particular society is not a purely public char-ity. City of Philadelphia v. Masonic Home of Pennsylvania, 160 Pa. St. 572.
Thecourt ingeniously bases its decision onthefact that "orphan children of de-ceased Odd Fellows of Kansas" have become orphans not by their own volun-tary act, but by fortuitous circumstances over which they necessarily had
no control.
CONTRACTS-VALIDITY-MUTUALITY.-CRANE ET AL. V. CRANE & CO., 105
Fed. 869.-C. Crane & Co., wholesale lumber dealers, agreed to supply Crane
et al., who bought and sold hard wood lumber, with all the dock oak that
they would want for their trade in the Chicago market during the year 1897
at certain prices. Held, that this contract is void for want of mutuality.
Contracts, to furnish a foundry with all the coal needed for the season; or
a furnace company its requirements in the way of iron; or a hotel itsnecessary
supply of ice, have been upheld. Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Whitebreast Coal
Co., 160 Ill. 85; National Furnace Co. v. Keystone Co., 110 Ill. 427. But in
these cases, although the quantity under contract is not measured by anycertain standard, yet it is callableofanapproximately accurate forecast by thevendor. In the case at bar, if the contract has been upheld the vendor wouldhave been placed in an unfair position, for if prices had risen the vendee couldpurchase any amount at the contract price, while if prices had fallen thevendor could not compel the vendee to purchase.
RECRNT CASES.
COPYRIGHT-INFRINGEMENT-RIGHT OF OWNER TO REBIND BOOK.-DoA2 ET
AL v. AMERicAN BOOK Co., 105 Fed. 772.-A preliminary injunction restrained
Doan et al., dealers in second-hand books, among other things from binding
or rebinding any copies (second-hand or new) of various kinds of school-books
copyrighted by the American Book Co. but purchased by Doan et al. Court
held this injunction too broad.
The sale of the books by the appellee carried with it the ordinary incidents
of ownership in personal property, including the right of alienation which
could not be restrained by virtue of the copyright statutes. Harrison v. May-
nard, 61 Fed. 689. If a person legally acquires the title to that which is the
subject of letters patent, he may continue to use it until it is worn out, or he
may repair it or improve it as he pleases, 'in the same manner as if it were
property of any other kind. Chaffee v. Belting Co., 22 How. 217. The
opinion of the court was that although Doan etal. had the right to rebind and
recover these books in exact similitude of the originals, still they were guilty
of unfair competition an~d could be compelled to hae the word " re-bound " or
"sre-covered " stamped upon the books in order to protect the American Book
Co. and also the children who purchased the books.
EMINENT DOMAIN-PRIvATE PROPERTY-COMPENSATION.-PARKER ET AL.
V. COMMONWEALTH, 59 N. E. 634 (Mass.).-Where the height of buildings on
a small tract of land west of the State House in Boston was limited by statute
to seventy feet, ostensibly for the purpose of preserving the view of this public
structure on the eminence, held, that, since the statute did notexpressly provide
that compensation should be withheld, the owners of land on this tract were
entitled to have their damages assessed.
This case is a remarkable illustration of the line between eminent domain
and police power. Acts of the former are compensated; those oftbe latter are
not. The commonwealth argued the latter, claiming that legislation for the
aesthetic sense was as much a police regulation as that for protection from
fire, citing Att'y Gen'l v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476 ; see also Lewis on Eminent
Domain (Second Ed.), Sec. 156. But the tendency is rather to restrict acts of
police power to preservation of life, health, and morals, and to class all other
public appropriation of private property with eminent domain. 18Am. &Eng.
Ency. of Law, 742.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-SHARES OWNED BY RESIDENTs-UNIFORMITY OF
TAxEs.-BACON v. TAx CoMMnssIoNERs, 85 N. W. 307 (Mich.).-A statute pro-
dded that stock in foreign corporations belonging to inhabitants of Michigan
should be taxed, but exempted stock in domestic corporations whose capital
was taxed in Michigan. Under it a tax was levied on stock of the N. Y. Cen-
tral, which is taxed on its capital stock in New York. Held, that such a stat-
ute does not violate the constitutional requirement of uniform taxation.
Grant, J., dissenting.
Although the court expresses doubt of both the policy and the abstract
justice of such double taxation, yet it was held a matter for the determination
of the legislature within its discretion. The question involved is new in this
State, but the decision is well supported, Graham v. St.Joseph Tp., 67 Mich.
652 ; Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511. A strong dissenting opinion, however,
points out a different rule in Kimball v. Milford, 54 N.H. 406 ; People v. Com-
missioners of Taxes, 4 Hum (N. Y.) 595.
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HABITUAl. CnInINALs-ADDITIONAL PUNISHMENT ON THIRD ColvIcTIoN-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES PROVIDING THEREFOR.-JOHN A. McDoN-
ALD V. CoM. oF MASS., 21 Sup. Ct. 389.-A criminal alleged to have served
two terms in state prison, aggregating seven years, upon conviction for for-
gery, was adjudged an habitual criminal and sentenced to state prison for
twenty-five years under the provisions of Mass. Statutes of 1887, Chap. 435.
Held, that the statute did not violate constitutional provisions against impos-
ing additional punishment for former crimes, expost facto laws, putting per-
sons twice in jeopardy for the same offense, inflicting unusual or cruel punish-
ments, denying equal protection of the laws, and was constitutional.
This is a Supreme Court case in accordance with the weight of State
authority.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-REGULATION OF RATES-COMPETITION A FACTOR.
-INTERSTATE COMMERCE COM. v. SOUTHERN Ry. Co. ET AL., 105 Fed. Rep.
703 (Ala.).-Defendant company was charged with violating Sec. 4 of the
Act to Regulate Commerce by charging a higher rate between Baltimore and
Piedmont, Alabama, than between Baltimore and Anniston, Alabama, a more
distant point on the same line. Defendant defended on the ground that a
lower rate to Anniston was made necessary on account of competition with
another line subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. Held, that compe-
tition is an element to be taken into account in determining whether a rate is
unjust and unreasonable.
The construction of the fourth section of the Act to Regulate Commerce,
and the question whether competition is a proper subject to be considered in
charging a greater rate for a shorter than is asked for a longer distance, are
fully discussed in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Int. Com. Comm., 162 U. S. 197.
There the court held that competition affecting rates should be considered in
determining whether charges are or are not undue and unjust. See also Irnt.
Com. Comm. v. Ala. Midland Ry. Co., 168 U. S. 164.
MONOPOLIES-ANTI-TRusT ACT-COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF INTER-
STATE COMMERCE.-LOWERY v. TILE, MANTEL AND GRATE ASS'N Or CAL. ET
AL., 106 Fed. Rep. 38 (Cal.).-The purpose of defendant company's organiza-
tion was to unite "all acceptable dealers" in tiles, etc., in San Francisco and
vicinity, and all American manufacturers of tiles, etc. Members were elected
and fees were exacted. No dealer and active member could purchase from any
manufacturer who was not a member and no manufacturer who was a mem-
ber could sell his products to any dealer who was not a member. Held, that
such association was in violation of Sections I and 2 of the Anti-Trust Act
of 1890.
This case is in line with the decision in Addystone Pipe and Steel Co. v. U.
S., 175 U. S. 246, which holds that any combination among dealers in that
kind of commodities, which in its direct and immediate effect precludes all com-
petition and enhances the purchase price for which such commodity would
otherwise be delivered at its destination in another State, would be one inrestraint of trade or commerce among the States. But in U. S. v. Coal Dealers
Ass'n, 85 Fed. Rep. 252, it is held immaterial whether the restraint is fair and
reasonable br whether it has increased the price of the commodity.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-WATER TAX-FRONTAGE ASSESSMENT.-RAMSEY
COUNTY V. A. P. LEwIs Co., 85 N. W. 207 (Minn.).-The charter of the city
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of St. Paul provided that an annual tax of 10 cents per frontage foot should
be assessed upon every lot in front of which water pipes were laid. Held, that
such statute is invalid under the Federal Constitution, being a taking of pri-
vate property without just compensation and without due process of law.
This is the first authoritative declaration of the law for Minnesota as to
the bearing of the Federal Constitution upon legislative power of assessment
for local improvements. Prior to Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269,
according to the trend of American decisions, this power was practically un-
limited. The justification of a special assessment is the special benefit con-
ferred, but where the assessment is without reference to the benefits and with
no provision for a hearing or review, it violates the citizen's constitutional
rights. Sears v. Commissioners, 173 Mass. 350; Fay v. City of Sprin geld,
94 Fed. 409.
NATIONAL BANKS-PLEDGEE AS STOCKHOLDER OF.-F. WINDSOR RoBINso
v. SOUTHERN NATIONAL.BAwK or N. Y., 21 Sup. Ct. 383.-A bank received
stock of a national bank as collateral security for a note. Upon default of the
note thestock was sold at auction and bought in by the pledgee bank, but was
not transferred on the books of the national bank. Held, the pledgee bank is
not liable as a stockholder in the national bank.
A pledgee of national bank stock who does not appear upon the books or
otherwise to be the owner is not liable as a stockholder. Welles v. Larrabee,
36 Fed. Rep. 866 ; Anderson v. Phil. Warehouse Co., 111 U. S. 479. Nor is
he liable when stock is entered upon the books in his name as pledgee. Pauly
v. State Loan & T. Co., 178 S. Ct. Rep. 465. The legal title and legal liabil-
ity is in him in whose name stock is registered. Richardson v. Abendroth, 43
Barb. (N. Y.) 162. For contrary rulings see Wheelock v. Kost, 77111. 296;
Pullman v. Upton, 96 U. S. 328 ; Matthews v.Mass. Nat'l Bank, 1 Holmes U.
S. 410; also in re Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 199, pledgee liable as equitable
owner. The court agreed with the lower courts in thinking that the stockwas
held, as regards the debtor, merely as collateral security for his debt.
PAUPERS-SUPPORT BY PRIVATE PERSONS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY.-
PATRICK v. TOWN or BALDWIN, 85 N. W. 274 (Wis.).-A physician rendered
services to a pauper without direction or employment by the supervisor of the
poor. Held, that he could not recover from the town.
There are cases holding public corporations liable even without notice to
its officers of the necessity for relief, Town of Charlestown v. Town of Lun-
enburg, 23 Vt. 525, and there is much authority to the effect that if one fur-
nish necessary relief to a poor person, after notice to the public officers, he
may recover as on an implied contract. Smith v. Inhabitants of Colerain, 9
Metc. 492. Wile v. Town of Southbury, 43 Conn. 53. All of these decisions
are based upon statutes. There being no common law obligation to maintain
paupers, when a legislature has gone no further than to create a legal obliga-
tion to support poor persons, and to designate municipal agents to incur the
necessary obligations to that end, no such obligation can exist without some
clearly expressed consent given by such agents.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-LICENSEs-FALURE TO PROCURE-FEES--
COLLECTIONS.-MAYFIELD V. NALE, 59 N. R. 415 (Ind.).-Where a statute
provided that a physician, who did not obtain a certain license before prac-
tising in a county, should be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, held, that a
physician not complying with such statute could not recover for services
rendered.
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The general rule is that a contract made in violation of a law that pro-
vides for the licensing of persons engaged in certain occupations, is void.
Bowdre v. Carter, 64 Miss. 221; Stanwood v. Woodward, 38 Me. 192; Ster-
enson v. Ewing, 3 Pickle 46; but the contrary has also been held in similarcases. Shepler v. Scott, 85 Pa. St. 329; Jones v. Berry, 23 N. H. 209. Thoughin most States laws similar to the present one provide that there shall beno recovery for services rendered in violation thereof, yet it would not seemto be necessary, especially where the statute expressly says that a violationof it shall be deemed a misdemeanor. Orrv. Meek, 111 Ind. 40; Ingersoll
v. Randall, 14 Minn. 304.
RAILROADS-NEGLIGENCE-TRESPASSER ON TRACK-INFANTS-CONTRIBU-
TORY NEGLIGENCE.-TRUDELL v. GRAND TRUNK Ry. Co., 85 N. W. 250
(Mich.).-A boy seven years and four months old was killed bythe defendant'strain. The court submitted the proposition of the negligence of the boy to the
jury. Held, that it was error to submit the question of his contributory neg-
ligence to the jury.
This case seems to contradict a mass of decisions which hold that it is a
question of fact for the jury whether a child exercised the ordinary care and
diligence which is expected from a child similarly situated. 7 Am. and Eng.
Ency. Law (Second Ed.), 409; Bvansick v. Gulf, etc., Ry. Co., 57 Tex. 126;RailroadCo.v.Stout, 17 Wallace664. All these cases refer to accidents at cross-ings, while in the case at bar, the child was a trespasser on the tracks. Thereis sharp conflict among the authorities as to what the duty of a railroad com-pany is to children who come upon its premises as trespassers, but the courtholds to the general rule that a railroad companyis no more bound to keep itspremises safe for children, who are trespassers, than it is to keep them safe foradults. Elliott on Railroads, See. 1259.
SiDEwALKs-SPECIAL TAX-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw.-JoB ET AL. V. CITY
OF ALTON, 59 N. .. 622 (Ill.)-A city ordinance under a statute provided for
the construction of a sidewalk by the owners, the expense to be borne in pro-
portion to frontage. The city constructed a sidewalk for the delinquent plain-
tiff and levied against his property. Held, that, though the statute did not
provide for an assessment in proportion to the benefit accruing to the land
from the sidewalk, U. S. Constitution, Amend. 14, was not thereby violated,
since the ordinance was not unreasonable or oppressive.
The leading case on which the plaintiff relied is Village of Norwood v. Ba-
ker, 172 U. S. 269, where it was held that an assessment for the construction
of a street whose cost was in substantial excess of the benefit conferred uponthe abutting land was void. This case was also applied iti Dexter v. City ofBoston, 57 N. E. 379. But the court pointed out that these two cases broughtextreme hardship upon the property-owner and plainly violated theFourteenth Amendment. This decision, nevertheless, practically reiteratesthat of the Norwood case; for "unreasonable and oppressive" is but the ap-plication of adjectives to "a cost- of construction in substantial excess of thebenefit conferred." Unjust assessments have been previously held void in Illi-
nois. See Hawes v. City of Chicago, 158 Ill 653; Cra v. VillageofTolono,
96 flL. 252.
STREET RmLwAYs-RDING ON PLATFORm-NOTICE FORBIDDING.-SWEET-
LAND v. LYNN AND B. R. Co., 59 N. B. 443 (Mass.).-Where a notice on a
street car forbade persons riding on front platform, but, the car being crowded,
the plaintiff and many others rode there and sustained injuries, held, that the
defendant by habitually allowing passengers to ride on the front platform and
collecting fares from them waived the prohibition.
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This case sets forth emphatically the principle that the habitual acts of a
servant may revoke any express instructions to the public by the master; for
the injured plaintiff was well warranted in believing that the master had
waived the prohibition. This decision, of course, still leaves open the question
as to what and how many acts of the servant will constitute a waiver of the
prohibition by the master; or, on the other hand, will it be necessary that a
plaintiff should have observed acts of waiver previous to the occasion
of his injury.
TAXATION OF BICYCLES-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUT.- -LLIS V. FaR-
ZmR, 63 Pacific 642 (Oregon).-Oregon Laws of 1899, p. 152, authorized a
special tax of $1.25 on bicycles for the purpose of constructing and maintain-
ing bicycle paths on highways and other places. Held, in violation of the
Constitution, which provides that rates of taxation and assessment shall be
equal and uniform.
This act was designed as a means of raising revenue, hence the burden
imposed was a tax and not a license. A specific tax of one cent on each acreof
taxable land in a certain township was not an equal and uniformtax. Bright
v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223. As the use of a bicycle tends to its destruction
and the price depends upon its age, pattern, condition, and the material of
which it is composed, so that the value must be varient, an act which levies
$1.25 upon each bicycle in use, irrespective of its value, is plainly not an equal
and uniform one.
UNITED STATES-CUSTOMS DuTIES-STATUS OF ANNEXED TERRITORY.-CROSs-
MAN ET AL. V. UNITED STATES, 105 Fed. Rep. 608.-The provision of the joint
resolution for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands which retained in force
the same customs duties between Hawaii and the ports of the United States
as formerly, is constitutional.
The opinion in this case is brief but extremely well considered. It is of
great interest as the first decision of a Federal court defining the status of
Hawaii. The decision in this case follows the line of argument laid down in
the two Porto Rican cases, ex-parte Ortiz, 100 Fed. Rep. 955; Goetze v.
United States, 103 Fed. Rep. 72. However, this case differs from both of the
cases cited above in establishing the power of Congress to govern acquired
territory in that Hawaii was not acquired by treaty with any foreign power
and does not involve military occupation but is, by act of Congress, a part of
the territory of the United States.
WILLS-TRUSTS-INTENTION.-DAVIES V. DAVIES, 85 N. W. 201 (Wis.).-A
will drawn by the testator left all his estate to his widow "to hold in trust"
for his infant son. Held, that, considering all the circumstances, and the will
as a whole, and the fact the testator, though educated, might have been igno-
rant of the technical meaning of the words "in trust," the intention must
have been to give the widow a beneficial interest.
This result carries the rules governing construction to a considerable
length. Where a testator uses technical words, he is supposed to employ them
in a technical sense unless there is a clear intention otherwise. Fetrow's Es-
tate, 58 Pa. St. 424. Furthermore, the words "in trust" are less likely to a
mistaken use than other common technical words like "heirs" and "legatee."
